Introduction
In 2005, the guardian of a venerable American institution, a prime tourist destination and pride of many a Philadelphian, was moved to take action against a perceived cultural threat. Joey Vento, proprietor of Geno's Cheesesteaks at the corner of 9 th Street and Passyunk Avenue, placed a sign in his shop window bearing a bald eagle, an American flag, and the words "This Is America; When Ordering 'Speak English.'" Vento, the grandson of Italian immigrants to the United States, renewed a concern that had been raised a century before, when his own ancestors arrived, and a century or more before that, as a Protestant, English-speaking natives became home to growing numbers of Germans and Irish Catholics. The presence of newcomers has consistently raised concerns regarding threats to American cultural and civic institutions-the English language prominent among them.
The passage of time has proven many of these earlier worries unfounded. There is no significant German or Italian-speaking minority in the United States. The erosion of cultural differences between earlier waves of immigrants and the English-speaking mainstream offers little comfort to critics of modern immigration. Roughly half of all immigrants to the United States in more recent years speak a single foreign language-Spanish. This is a stark contrast to the era of European immigrants, when those speaking German or Italian were joined by large numbers of migrants from smaller European countries speaking more obscure languages, as well as many from the United Kingdom and Ireland who spoke English. immigration to a halt. Even in the recovery period that followed, immigration to the United States has not resumed its pre-recession trajectory. Migration from Mexico, in particular, has remained stagnant, while immigration from Asia has accelerated. The composition of newly arrived immigrants to the United States has been radically transformed. As will be shown below, newly arrived immigrants are better assimilated along multiple dimensions than their predecessors-even before accounting for the fact that immigrants are always least assimilated when they first arrive in the United States.
Why Assimilation Matters
Calls for immigrants to adopt the language and culture of the host country are often dismissed as xenophobic. The term "assimilation" has been rejected in some academic circles, for implying that one culture or set of norms is superior to all others and that immigrants ought to be judged by the degree to which they conform to it. In more recent years, however, a more nuanced pattern of support for assimilation, at least along certain key dimensions, has emerged (Alba and Nee 2005) . In part, this stems from the recognition that members of any ethnic group need not abandon their own culture or norms when they familiarize themselves with those of another group. A non-native English speaker, for example, generally does not forget his or her native language upon learning English, and is free to use that native language at home or in public interactions with members of their own ethnic group. Sociologists have also recognized the concept of "segmented" assimilation, meaning that immigrants can fully accept the political or linguistic norms of their host society while maintaining a degree of distinctiveness along other dimensions (Zhou 1997) . These other dimensions might include religious practice, consumption habits, or selection of children's extracurricular activities.
There is a sound economic rationale for promoting cultural assimilation (Lazear 1999) . In competitive markets, transactions occur when buyers of sellers can mutually agree on a price for a good or service that leaves both parties better off. The process of arriving at a mutual agreement, however, depends critically on the ability of the parties to communicate with one another. The lack of a common language is an obvious barrier to communication. Other types of cultural differences might forestall mutually beneficial transactions as well. A seller might represent a culture where haggling over price is the norm, and therefore set a price that is higher than what he or she is minimally willing to accept. A buyer accustomed to a norm of paying the list price might see this high price, assume that it is non-negotiable, and walk away from a potentially viable transaction.
Either type of barrier to trade could conceivably be overcome with the assistance of a translator or facilitator familiar with the norms of both cultures. Such assistance is not typically costless, however, and must often be arranged in advance. As such, the barriers that exist when buyers and sellers cannot effectively communicate with one another can be likened to a tax on the transaction. Like any other tax, the theorized effect is to reduce the number of transactions below that which would occur in a perfectly functioning market, reducing social welfare in the process.
For any member of a multicultural society, there are incentives to familiarize oneself with the norms and language of cultures other than one's own. The incentives are rooted in the promise of being able to more frequently conduct successful transactions with representatives of the other cultures. These benefits must be weighed against the costs of acquiring this familiarity.
It is straightforward to show, in an economic model, that the incentives to bridge cultural gaps are not strong enough to attain the "optimal" level of multicultural understanding. The cause is a classic externality problem. When one actor in the economy bridges a cultural gap, that actor will engage in more transactions, which increase surplus for herself and for her trading partner. The actor internalizes the benefit to herself, but not to a partner.
From a public policy perspective, then, there is a positive role for government to promote the adoption of a common language and norms governing market transactions. The most costeffective manner of promoting this commonality is to encourage members of minority linguistic or cultural groups to adopt the culture of the mainstream. This strategy is not rooted in any notion of the supremacy of one culture over another, but rather simple mathematics. If our goal is to incentivize the adoption of a common language, society will spend the least on incentives if it offers them to those in the minority. The aversion of ethnic riots is not the only social benefit derived from immigrant acceptance of civic institutions. Governments bear the responsibility of providing public goods to the population, and the greater the proportion of residents sharing in the burden of providing those goods, the lower the cost to any one resident. National defense is the textbook example of a public good; the cost of providing defense is measured not only in terms of dollars but in service and sacrifice. On a more domestic level, government is charged with ensuring public safety. The burden of immigration on society is minimized when migrants exhibit a greater respect for law, reducing the strain on the criminal justice system.
Beyond these core responsibilities, governments in the developed world are also responsible for redistribution and the provision of social welfare. The possibility that immigrants might disproportionately burden the social welfare system has long worried immigration opponents. In a sense, then, immigrants can support the civic functions of the state by being net contributors to the social welfare system.
Previous Studies of Assimilation
Social scientists have adopted a range of methods and measures to track the progress of immigrants and their children as they acclimate to a host society. Ethnographers have immersed themselves in enclave neighborhoods (Gans 1962 and Margolis 2009) . Sociologists have fielded large-scale surveys and followed up with interviews (Kasinitz et al. 2008 Empirical evidence supports the modeling of second language acquisition as a form of investment, where upfront costs are weighed against a future stream of benefits (Chiswick, 2008) . Economists Barry Chiswick and Paul Miller, studying non-Anglophone immigrants in English-speaking nations, finds that the process of learning English proceeds most rapidly when migrants are younger, belong to smaller linguistic groups, have a smaller family network to rely on, and lack access to sources of news in their native language (Chiswick and Miller 1996; . The lack of a first-language network to acquire information increases the potential benefits of learning the host country language, and younger immigrants can look forward to a longer stream of benefits once they become multilingual. Most studies of immigrants and language ability use cross-sectional data, introducing the concern that apparent progress in learning the host country language might instead reflect selective return migration-the departure of immigrants who never speak English well. Espinosa and Massey (1997) use a longitudinal cross-national sample to show that migrants make real progress over time.
Intermarriage-the propensity to select a spouse outside one's own ethnic group-is often considered the ultimate form of cultural assimilation. In both recent and historical data, intermarriage is very uncommon among first-generation migrants (Drachsler 1920; Pagnini and Morgan 1990; Qian and Lichter 2001) . Rates of marriage across ethnic groups increase dramatically in subsequent generations. When considering the cultural assimilation of the first generation, then, English ability is the dominant discriminating factor.
Just as the decision to learn English can be modeled as an investment decision, evidence supports the role of costs and benefits in the decision to become a naturalized citizen. The benefits of naturalization include eligibility for a range of career opportunities open only to citizens, the right to participate in government by voting or holding office, and immunity from future changes in immigration policy. The costs include preparing for the citizenship examination, and in some cases relinquishing citizenship in one's country of birth. Multiple studies have established that immigrants naturalize more rapidly when the option of retaining birth citizenship is less attractive-because a migrant was born in a poor, oppressive, or war-torn country (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1986 and Chiswick and Miller 2008) . Immigrants born in nations recognizing dual citizenship are also more likely to become naturalized citizens (Chiswick and Miller 2008) .
Once immigrants take the step of becoming citizens, additional questions arise regarding their political tendencies. As Bryan Caplan and Vipul Naik point out in their contribution to this volume, immigrants responding to the General Social Survey (GSS) are on average more economically liberal-as measured by questions eliciting favorability toward social insurance programs and regulation-and socially conservative than the native-born. The GSS does not necessarily capture a representative sample of the U.S. immigrant population, as it administers surveys only in English. Including non-English speaking immigrants in the sample might accentuate the dimensions of difference between immigrants and natives.
Bearing in mind that assimilation is a process that plays out over time and in some cases across generations, one might hypothesize that the political differences between immigrants and natives dissipate over time. One study, also using the GSS, found increasing degrees of national attachment among immigrants who had spent more time in the United States (Huddy and Khatib 2007). Immigration may also invoke countervailing political preferences in the native-born population, as suggested in literature reviewed by Caplan and Naik. It is instructive to note that the significant expansion of the American welfare state that began with the New Deal and extended through the Great Society coincided with the period of least overall immigration to the United States, suggesting that the effect of immigration on natives' support for redistribution swamps the effect of adding foreign-born citizens to the roster of voters.
Prior studies of assimilation, in summary, have taught us much about how the process works in general, and suggest that conclusions about the process tend to concord across dimensions studied. This pattern supports the approach outlined below, which aggregates information along multiple dimensions to a set of summary index measures. The advantage of this approach is that summary measures can be computed with both recent and historical data, permitting a direct comparison of assimilation in the early 20 th and early 21 st centuries-a perspective not represented in prior literature, with the exception of Perlmann's (2005) comparative analysis of Italians and Mexicans, which is of course limited to those ethnic groups.
Measuring Past and Present Assimilation
The discussion above suggests several methods of assessing the degree of immigrant assimilation. Along cultural dimensions, one could assess immigrants' English-speaking ability, and perhaps devise a questionnaire to measure familiarity with American cultural and marketplace norms. A questionnaire could also help determine migrants' familiarity with American civic institutions, as well as asking questions about a range of civic behaviors from becoming a naturalized citizen, to participating in elections, serving in the military, or holding an elected position of leadership in the community.
The challenge associated with drafting a new questionnaire to assess civic and cultural assimilation is that it is impossible to administer that questionnaire to immigrants of a decade ago, let alone a century. Without comparable information on past generations of immigrants, it is impossible to answer the question posed at the start of this chapter: whether today's immigrants progress towards the mainstream more or less rapidly than their predecessors. While there have been no systematic surveys collecting information on all the above-mentioned assimilation indicators over the past century, the United States Census provides an alternate source of information on certain indicators.
The Census, administered to the entire American population every ten years since 1790, has always collected information on respondents' birthplace as well as information on year of arrival in the United States, citizenship, English-speaking ability, military service, and marital status. This last item can help determine whether an immigrant is intermarried, which has long been considered an indicator of cultural assimilation. The Census ceased collecting this detailed information following the 2000 enumeration, but in its wake the American Community Survey has provided data for a 1% sample of American households annually.
A simple method of assessing assimilation, then, is to track specific indicators such as English-speaking ability or naturalization rates over time. As a summary measure of cultural or civic assimilation, this chapter will present an assimilation index, which can be interpreted as the degree of distinction between the native-and foreign-born populations at any given point in time.
The assimilation index begins by using data on a random sample consisting of 50% natives and 50% immigrants. Using information on a series of indicators drawn from the Census, the data are used to estimate a statistical model that predicts whether an individual is foreignborn on the basis of the indicators. Some indicators, such as lack of citizenship, perfectly predict whether an individual is foreign-born. Not all citizens are native-born, however. When immigrants and natives are very distinct from one another, this statistical model will have strong predictive power-it will make very few errors in guessing whether an individual is born abroad.
In cases where the model can perfectly predict where an individual was born, the assimilation index takes on a value of zero. As the two groups become more similar, the model will make errors more frequently. At the extreme, in a scenario where all immigrants were naturalized citizens, spoke English fluently, and approximated native behavior along other dimensions, the model would do no better than random guessing. In this case, the assimilation index would take on a value of 100.
The assimilation index can be computed for the entire foreign-born population, or for subsets of the population drawn along various lines. It is often instructive, for example, to consider the assimilation of members of specific immigrant groups, those living in certain metropolitan areas, or those who report arriving in the United States during a specific interval.
The index of cultural assimilation incorporates four data points on every individual represented in the data: their ability to speak English, their marital status and whether they are married to a native-born spouse, and the number of children in their household. The index of civic assimilation considers past or present military service and citizenship.
5 Indicators of Civic Assimilation Comparing English ability over long periods using Census data is complicated by the fact that the method of assessing ability changed over time. Between 1930 and 1970 , the Census had switched from using in-person enumerators to mail surveys. English ability was no longer assessed in person, for the most part, but reported by respondents themselves. Moreover, language ability was no longer coded as a simple yes-no question. Instead, immigrants were permitted to rate their English ability on a five-point scale separating those who spoke English at home, at one extreme, from those who could not speak English at all in the other.
With these caveats in mind, the data show that the cohort of immigrants arriving in the late 1970s had much better English skills than their predecessors of the 1890s. Recalling that these migrants themselves would be upstaged by their successors arriving in the years after 2000, particularly after the onset of the Great Recession, it is reasonably safe to say that the English skills of newly arrived immigrants to the United States are better now than they have been at any point in at least one century, and possibly two. There is a strong contrast to this pattern visible in many European nations at present.
From North Africans in France to Turks in Germany to Middle Eastern immigrants in
Scandinavia, experiences in nations where ethnicity has long been tied to nationality have differed markedly. Figure 6 shows the result of an exercise using national Census data from nine nations to compute assimilation indices. The indices consider a common set of factors observed in all datasets, encompassing civic, cultural, and economic factors. Only two nations in the set post assimilation values that exceed those in the United States. One is Canada, a nation that like the United States has long disassociated ethnicity from national identity. The second is Portugal, a special case as many individuals coded as foreign-born individuals residing in that nation are ethnic Portuguese born in colonies such as Angola and Mozambique who returned to their native land when those colonies attained independence.
The greater assimilation of North American immigrants, relative to those in Europe, can be thought of as representing the existence of a unique cultural institution-immigration itself. In addition, variation in national policies undoubtedly plays a role. In the United States, for example, native-born children of immigrants-even undocumented ones-are entitled to citizenship. This is not the case in many European nations. The wait for citizenship, long as it is in the United States, can be far longer in Europe. Canada's standard three-year waiting period might help explain why its immigrants top the assimilation scale. And while economic assimilation is best thought of as a distinct dimension from the cultural and civic factors analyzed here, the greater rigidities brought about by European labor market regulations in many cases lock immigrants out of the labor market. In the United States, unemployment is significantly less common among immigrants than natives; in European countries the reverse is often true.
The notion that immigrants constitute a threat to cultural or civic institutions in Europe, but not the United States, is born out with several additional observations. As noted above, any inherently weak, and that as permanent residents of society they might disrespect or actively work to undermine them.
With each prior worrisome immigration wave, concerns about lack of fealty to American institutions were coupled with a fear that the wave of migration would have no end.
Economically motivated migrants have typically come from nations undergoing what is known
as the demographic transition. In nations with a primitive public health infrastructure, mortality rates from infectious disease tend to be high, and families generally factor this high mortality risk into fertility decisions. As sanitation and health care infrastructure improve, mortality declines.
When parents fail to anticipate or recognize these mortality decreases, maintaining high fertility rates, the result is a population explosion. The explosion usually corrects itself in time, as fertility rates drop. As noted above, the demographic transition in Mexico is now complete, as fertility rates have fallen dramatically over the past generation. In fact, the transition is now complete in virtually all parts of the world, with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa. African migration to the United States has increased in recent decades, however the most common destination for African migrants is continental Europe rather than North America, for the simple reason that it is less costly to travel there.
Given these demographic trends, it would appear safe to conclude that the threat to American cultural and civic institutions posed by recent migrants to the United States, undocumented though many of them may be, is minimal. Like all waves of immigrants before them, these newcomers are dwindling in number and in the long run they will all succumb. Their children, citizens when born here, will be educated in American schools and thereby socialized to understand and value American history, government, and culture, just as the children of European immigrants were in previous centuries. While there are reasons to think of contemporary migration from Spanish-speaking nations as distinct from earlier waves of immigration, evidence does not support the notion that this wave of migration poses a true threat to the institutions that withstood those earlier waves.
Basic indicators of assimilation, from naturalization to English ability, are if anything stronger now than they were a century ago. Moreover, just as earlier waves of migration came to an end once the sending countries had completed the demographic transition, there is evidence that the rate of migration from Mexico has exhibited what will be a permanent decline.
The worldview most conducive to supporting restrictions on immigration is one where the host country possesses finite wealth, and newcomers threaten to not only demand a share of that wealth but arrive in numbers sufficient to change the rules by which it is distributed. This worldview is difficult to reconcile with a reality where human capital has supplanted natural resources and physical capital as the most important determinant of wealth. It is even more difficult to reconcile with a reality where the civic institutions that incentivize the investments that produce capital are the very things that motivate immigrants to arrive in the first place. 
